Tender: Consultancy to assess market power and leverage of ambitious states in the Plastics Treaty negotiations

The global community is at a pivotal moment in the quest to end plastic pollution. The recent INC 5.2 session in Geneva revealed both the high level of ambition among nations and the enduring challenges to conclude an effective treaty, with negotiations stalling over disagreements about binding measures.

WWF has responded by emphasising the urgent need for a coalition-first approach, where a group of willing and ambitious states leverages their collective market power to drive progress, even in the absence of full consensus. Drawing lessons from successful international environmental agreements, the approach recognises that effectiveness does not depend on universal participation from the outset, but rather on the ability of a committed coalition to make participation and compliance the rational choice for all actors over time.

This project aims to provide the strategic foundation and evidence base for such an approach. It will explore how a coalition-first treaty design, supported by countries committed to binding global rules, can reshape incentive structures and catalyse transitions across the plastics economy.

The research includes two integrated parts: a qualitative analysis of policy options, conducted by WWF and partners; and a quantitative assessment, which WWF is seeking consultants to conduct the work on, to model the influence of coalition-driven binding measures, and identify the thresholds and possible compositions of coalitions to spark decisive global market shifts towards ending plastic pollution.

Please see the full Terms of Reference below for further details on the assignment. Proposals should be sent directly to tender@wwf.no and in cc to amyhrvold@wwf.no by March 19, 2026.

INC 5.2 in Geneva demonstrated the collective ambition of the international community. 133 countries have shown support for binding rules to end plastic pollution, including bans of the most high-risk plastic products and harmonised design requirements for plastic products to enable a safe circular economy. The session however ended in deadlock, as attempts to lower ambition to bridge substantive divergences did not deliver progress. The Chair’s text proposal that contained no binding rule was decisively rejected.

WWF’s recommendations for the negotiations following INC-5.2 emphasised that the group of states supporting binding global rules—representing a majority in the negotiations—must urgently explore all possible options to address the persistent faultlines that have blocked progress, including the potential of a coalition-first approach to the treaty development and adoption, ahead of the next INC meeting on substantive matters.

Experience from successful multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), such as The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the Montreal Protocol on Ozone-Depleting Substances, shows that universal (or near-universal) participation at the outset is neither necessary nor sufficient for effectiveness. When participation is prioritised above effectiveness, the results are often broad-but-shallow agreements that lack the measures to substantially address the environmental problems at hand.

Instead, strategic design choices that allow a committed coalition of states to leverage its collective market power to reshape incentives—making participation and compliance the rational choice for both participating and non-participating actors over time—could be the key to unlock a credible pathway for an effective treaty to end plastic pollution.

WWF seeks consultants for collaboration on a research project, to examine how a treaty with binding measures that is initially adopted by a coalition of states (i.e., without universal or near-universal participation at the outset) may be able to harness the parties’ market power to effectively drive market transition at scale.

The goal of this research project is to assess how a treaty with the necessary binding measures can effectively drive market transitions at scale to protect human health and the environment from plastic pollution, without universal or near-universal participation at the outset.

Specifically, it seeks to elaborate on how such a treaty—if adopted by a coalition of states supporting the binding measures—can restructure economic incentives for market actors, initiate market transitions by combining the market power of participating states, and drive de facto and/or formal alignment by non-participating states and market actors over time. The aim is to provide robust quantitative evidence to support coalition-driven approaches in the negotiations and the development of effective measures in the plastic pollution treaty.

The project will be implemented through close collaboration between WWF, its partners, and appointed consultants, integrating two complementary research streams.

1. Qualitative and Strategic Assessment of Policy Options: Conducted by WWF and its partners, this stream will evaluate binding measures necessary for protecting human health and the environment from plastic pollution. The assessment will outline:

• Key treaty measures, including targeted plastic products; and

• Mechanisms by which these measures are expected to influence market incentives and behaviours.

2. Quantitative Assessment of Participation Thresholds: Consultants will undertake a quantitative analysis to identify participation thresholds capable of inducing significant market shifts. This component will detail:

• How the collective market size of parties (to the treaty with specified measures) quantitatively affects market incentives and behaviours, including the thresholds where such effects become exponential; and

• Potential coalition configurations among supportive countries that could collectively achieve these market size thresholds.

The first research stream establishes policy options and conceptual frameworks, while the second builds on this foundation by validating and substantiating these options through quantitative analysis, modelling, and scenario projections.

WWF, its partners, and appointed consultants will jointly determine and prioritise market dynamics factors—such as transition cost/benefit ratios, market demand, investments in transition, and rates of innovation and technology diffusion—that are most critical to the effectiveness of the identified measures and corresponding market transitions.

The scope will focus on priority plastic products and measures, for example, high-risk plastic products requiring urgent binding measures, such as plastic packaging and single-use, short-lived plastic items that must be phased out or redesigned for a non-toxic, circular economy.

Key tasks include:

• Developing robust methodologies, and collecting and modelling relevant data to quantify the potential impact of the collective market size of treaty parties (implementing the specified measures) on market incentives and behaviours;

• Defining collective market size thresholds at which the impact on market incentives and behaviours becomes exponential;

• Identifying possible coalitions of supportive countries capable of achieving the defined thresholds.

1. Inputs to measures identified by WWF and partners

• Consultations with WWF and partner(s) to further specify and jointly agree on relevant details of the identified measures, the applicable groups of plastic products, and market incentives and behaviours the measures may alter.

2. Quantitative assessment

• Plastic consumption level by states, both overall and specified plastic product groups.

• Potential quantitative impacts of collective market size of treaty parties (implementing the specified measures) on market incentives and behaviours.

• Scenario projections and identification of market power thresholds, and possible coalitions of supportive countries to reach such thresholds.

• Documentation of methodologies, assumptions, and models.

3. Supporting Data Sets

• All data, models, and projections underpinning the quantitative assessment.

4. Presentations on preliminary findings and final research results

• To WWF’s teams and relevant stakeholders, in meetings convened by WWF, for the purpose of internal and external consultations.

• The presentations will be scheduled in advance, based on WWF’s request and in agreement with the consultants.

5. Technical report on collective market power, including the following key content (Consultants to deliver the text, with graphs and charts, as necessary—WWF will be responsible for the design of the final report)

• Executive summary, introduction (jointly by WWF, partners and consultants)

• Necessary binding measures to protect human health and environment (by WWF and partners, with inputs by consultants as necessary)

• Mechanisms of market transitions: incentives and behaviours (jointly by WWF, partners, and consultants)

• Plastic consumption levels and the demand-side power in market transitions (by consultants, with inputs by WWF and partners)

• Modelling market transitions: the influence of parties’ collective market size (by consultants, with inputs by WWF and partners)

• The thresholds for decisive market shifts (by consultants, with inputs by WWF and partners)

• The formation of coalitions for decisive market shifts (by consultants, with inputs by WWF and partners)

• Conclusion and recommendations (jointly by WWF, partners and consultants)

• Project start-up: late-March 2026

• WWF and partners’ policy analysis preliminary findings: early April 2026

• Preliminary quantitative findings: end of April 2026

• Final quantitative assessment results: mid May 2026

• First draft of Technical Report: late May 2026

• Second draft of Technical Report: early June 2026

• Final draft of Technical Report: late June 2026

• Launch of report: mid-July 2026

The outputs will be used to:

• Inform negotiation strategy and alliance-building among ambitious states;

• Provide an evidence base for advocating binding, coalition-driven treaty measures;

• Demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of coalition-first participation models; and

• Guide treaty design choices that maximise global impact under political constraints.

The technical report will be published, upon final sign-off by WWF, under WWF’s branding and design (co-branding is possible upon prior agreement with consultants).

To maintain strategic focus, the following activities are out of scope for the consultants’ assignment:

• General assessments of plastic pollution impacts not directly linked to treaty-relevant incentive structures;

• Stand-alone life-cycle assessments or environmental footprint studies unrelated to market power or regulatory leverage;

• Development of country-specific implementation plans or national action roadmaps;

• Broad scenario modelling of global plastic production or waste trends that is not clearly tied to coalition-based policy levers.

WWF will oversee the integrated project to ensure coherence between qualitative and quantitative workstreams, consistency of assumptions, and alignment of messaging. Consultants are expected to work iteratively across components and explicitly link policy analysis with modelling results.

Proposals should be sent directly to tender@wwf.no and in cc to amyhrvold@wwf.no by March 19, 2026.

Based on the contents of assignment described in the Terms of Reference, the candidates are requested to submit the following bidding document, in English: 

1. A technical proposal describing approach, methodology, and workplan (maximum 5 pages, not including the content in points below);
2. CVs and references of proposed team members;
3. A detailed budget, including estimated workdays, daily rates, and other costs;
4. A proposed project timeline aligned with the Indicative Timeline provided in this TOR.

The proposal should include a total price, broken down into expected time spent per staff and daily rates, as well as other costs. If applicable, the proposal should include a suggestion for scaling depending on available budget. The budget should indicate relevant taxes (VAT).

The project has a budget ceiling of 700 000 NOK. The team of consultants is invited to propose a budget range according to possible delivery for each of included steps to be evaluated by WWF, according to price criteria weighted at 40%. 

Proposals should demonstrate strong, relevant expertise on quantitative assessments for policy options, with particular emphasis on:

• Quantitative modelling and data analysis relevant to global commodity markets or supply chains;

• Economic analysis of regulatory effects;

• Demonstrated experience engaging with, or producing work directly relevant to, multilateral environmental negotiations;

• Ability to integrate qualitative policy logic with quantitative modelling in a way that is decision-relevant for governments;

• Familiarity with plastics markets, chemicals policy, or closely related industrial transition contexts is strongly preferred.

Proposals will be evaluated by a project committee in WWF and will be based on the following criteria, in addition to the tenderer being assessed for sustainability (environmental and social):

• Quality and robustness of the approach and methodology – 40%

• Relevant credentials, including experience and qualifications – 20%

• Price – 40%

1. Tenderers must provide information on their legal form and ownership structure. 

2. Tenderers shall be excluded from participation in a procurement procedure if: 

• they are bankrupt or being wound up, are having their affairs administered by the courts, have entered into an arrangement with creditors, have suspended business activities, are subject of proceedings concerning those matters, or are in any analogous situation arising from a similar procedure provided for in national legislation or regulations.  However, tenderers in this situation may be eligible to participate insofar as the Grant Recipient is able to purchase supplies on particularly advantageous terms from either a supplier which is definitively winding up its business activities, or the receivers or liquidators of a bankruptcy, through an arrangement with creditors, or through a similar procedure under national law; 

• they or persons having powers of representation, decision-making or control over them have been convicted of an offence concerning their professional conduct by a final judgement; 

• they have been guilty of grave professional misconduct; proven by any means which the Grant Recipient can justify; 

• they have not fulfilled obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions or taxes in accordance with the legal provisions of the country in which they are established, or with those of the country of the Grant Recipient or those of the country where the contract is to be performed; 

• they or persons having powers of representation, decision-making or control over them have been convicted for fraud, corruption, involvement in a criminal organisation or money laundering by a final judgement; 

• they make use of child labour or forced labour and/or practise discrimination, and/or do not respect the right to freedom of association and the right to organise and engage in collective bargaining pursuant to the core conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO). 

3. Tenderers shall confirm in writing that they are not in any of the situations listed above. Even if such confirmation is given by a tenderer, the Grant Recipient shall investigate any of the situations listed above if it has reasonable grounds to doubt the contents of such confirmation. 

4. Contracts shall not be awarded to tenderers which, during the procurement procedure: 

• are subject to a conflict of interests; 

• are guilty of misrepresentation in supplying the information required by the Grant Recipient as a condition of participation in the tender procedure or fail to supply this information.